This study looks at how oversight committees affect CEO compensation governance and how this affects publicly traded banks’ financial performance. It specifically looks at how compensation committee mandates and structural traits affect how CEO compensation is matched to company performance results. The research employs a panel dataset of sample firms across the study period, combining financial performance metrics like return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). It draws on agency theory and corporate governance theories. In addition to firm-level controls, the research takes into account committeelevel factors such independence, experience, frequency of meetings, and ownership. The findings obtained through panel regression methods and testing show that improved pay-performance sensitivity and improved financial performance do not correlate with committee influence, independence, or financial expertise. The importance of empowered oversight committees in reducing interagency conflicts of interest and fostering efficient governance is demonstrated by these findings. By emphasizing how internal governance frameworks can be used to produce long-term organizational goals, the study adds to the discussion surrounding executive compensation.
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